要約すると「米国防戦略、台湾への言及なし。対中抑止姿勢も大幅に後退。中国も受け入れ可能な妥当な平和を目指す」という事？
現在の公開情報と専門家の初期反応に基づくと、非常に的確な要約と言えます。
ただし、これは「米国のコミットメント完全放棄」というより、「直接的な軍事負担を減らし、同盟国に強く負担を求めながら、必要最小限の抑止で済ませる」路線へのシフトと見るのが正確そうです。日本など同盟国側にとっては、自国防衛力の抜本強化と「米軍頼み」の限界を突きつけられる内容になっています。
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump in his first term and since reentering office in January 2025 has rebuilt the
American military to be the world’s absolute best—its most formidable fighting force. But it is
essential to emphasize how much of an achievement this has been.
The fact is that President Trump took office in January 2025 to one of the most dangerous
security environments in our nation’s history. At home, America’s borders were overrun, narcoterrorists and other enemies grew more powerful throughout the Western Hemisphere, and U.S.
access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and Greenland was increasingly in doubt. Meanwhile
in Europe, where President Trump had previously led North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies to begin taking their defenses seriously, the last administration effectively
encouraged them to free-ride, leaving the Alliance unable to deter or respond effectively to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In the Middle East, Israel showed that it was able and willing to
defend itself after the barbaric attacks of October 7th—in short, that it is a model ally. Yet rather
than empower Israel, the last administration tied its hands. All the while, China and its military
grew more powerful in the Indo-Pacific region, the world’s largest and most dynamic market
area, with significant implications for Americans’ own security, freedom, and prosperity.
None of this was foreordained. America emerged from the Cold War as the world’s most
powerful nation by a wide margin. We were secure in our hemisphere, with a military that was
focused on warfighting and far superior to anyone else’s, engaged allies, and powerful industry.
But rather than husband and cultivate these hard-earned advantages, our nation’s post–Cold War
leadership and foreign policy establishment squandered them.
Rather than protect and advance
Americans’ interests, they opened
our borders, forgot the wisdom of
the Monroe Doctrine, ceded
influence in our hemisphere, and
outsourced America’s industry,
including the defense industrial
base (DIB) upon which our forces
rely. They sent America’s brave
sons and daughters to fight war
after rudderless war to topple
regimes and nation-build halfway
around the world, in doing so
eroding our military’s readiness and
delaying modernization. They
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth meets with World War II veterans in Normandy, France, on the 81st Anniversary of D-Day. These American heroes exemplify
the warrior ethos at the heart of the U.S. military.
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condemned our warfighters, criticizing and neglecting the warrior ethos that was once cultivated
and heralded by our forerunners—and that made this American military the envy of the world.
They allowed, even enabled, our cunning adversaries to grow more powerful, even as they
encouraged our allies to behave as dependents rather than partners, weakening our alliances and
leaving us more vulnerable. And so we found ourselves, in January 2025, facing not only a world
with individual regions at war or descending toward it but also increased risk of America itself
being drawn into simultaneous major wars across theaters—a third world war, as President
Trump himself warned.
That is all changing now. Under President Trump’s leadership, consistent with his vision and
direction as laid out in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Department of War (DoW) is
laser-focused on restoring peace through strength. As detailed in the NSS, the President’s
approach is one of a flexible, practical realism that looks at the world in a clear-eyed way, which
is essential for serving Americans’ interests.
This has clear implications for the Department of War. Above all, it means prioritizing the
missions that matter most for Americans’ security, freedom, and prosperity. This means
concentrating the Department’s efforts to:
► Defend the U.S. Homeland. We will secure America’s borders and maritime approaches,
and we will defend our nation’s skies through Golden Dome for America and a renewed
focus on countering unmanned aerial threats. We will maintain a robust and modern nuclear
deterrent capable of addressing the strategic threats to our country, raise and sustain
formidable cyber defenses, and hunt and neutralize Islamic terrorists who have the ability and
intent to strike our Homeland. At the same time, we will actively and fearlessly defend
America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and
commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and
Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against
narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors,
from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they
respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand
ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests. This is the
Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and America’s military stands ready to enforce it
with speed, power, and precision, as the world saw in Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
► Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. President Trump
seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and he has shown that he
is willing to engage President Xi Jinping directly to achieve those goals. But President Trump
has also shown how important it is to negotiate from a position of strength—and he has
tasked DoW accordingly. Consistent with the President’s approach, DoW will therefore seek
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and open a wider range of military-to-military communications with the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) with a focus on supporting strategic stability with Beijing as well as
deconfliction and de-escalation, more generally. But we will also be clear-eyed and realistic
about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup. Our goal in doing so
is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them. Rather, our goal is simple:
To prevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies—in
essence, to set the military conditions required to achieve the NSS goal of a balance of power
in the Indo-Pacific that allows all of us to enjoy a decent peace. To that end, as the NSS
directs, we will erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain (FIC). We will also
urge and enable key regional allies and partners to do more for our collective defense. In
doing so, we will reinforce deterrence by denial so that all nations recognize that their
interests are best served through peace and restraint. This is how we will establish a position
of military strength from which President Trump can negotiate favorable terms for our
nation. We will be strong but not unnecessarily confrontational. This is how we will help to
turn President Trump’s vision for peace through strength into reality in the vital Indo-Pacific.
► Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. Ours is not a strategy of isolation.
As the NSS directs, it is one of focused engagement abroad with a clear eye toward
advancing the concrete, practical interests of Americans. Through this America First,
commonsense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not
as the dependencies of the last generation. Rather, as the Department rightly prioritizes
Homeland defense and deterring China, other threats will persist, and our allies will be
essential to dealing with all of them. Our allies will do so not as a favor to us, but out of their
own interests. In the Indo-Pacific, where our allies share our desire for a free and open
regional order, allies and partners’ contributions will be vital to deterring and balancing
China. In Europe and other theaters, allies will take the lead against threats that are less
severe for us but more so for them, with critical but more limited support from the United
States.
In all cases, we will be honest but clear about the urgent need for them to do their part and
that it is in their own interests to do so without delay. We will incentivize and enable them to
step up. This requires a change in tone and style from the past, but that is necessary not only
for Americans but also for our allies and partners. For too long, allies and partners have been
content to let us subsidize their defense. Our political establishment reaped the credit while
regular Americans paid the bill. With President Trump, a new approach is in effect. Already,
President Trump has set a new global standard for defense spending at NATO’s Hague
Summit—3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on core military spending and an additional
1.5% on security-related spending, for a total of 5% of GDP. We will advocate that our allies
and partners meet this standard around the world, not just in Europe. As our allies do so,
together with the United States, they will be able to field the forces required to deter or defeat
potential adversaries in every key region of the world, even in the face of simultaneous
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aggression. This is how we will set conditions for lasting peace through strength around the
world.
► Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. President Trump is leading a once-in-acentury revival of American industry, re-shoring strategic industries to the United States and
revitalizing the industries previous generations had shipped overseas. We will harness this
historic initiative to rebuild our nation’s defense industry, which underpins our defense and
that of our allies and partners. We must return to being the world’s premier arsenal, one that
can produce not only for ourselves but also for our allies and partners at scale, rapidly, and at
the highest levels of quality. To achieve this, we will reinvest in U.S. defense production,
building out capacity; empowering innovators; adopting new advances in technology, like
artificial intelligence (AI); and clearing away outdated policies, practices, regulations, and
other obstacles to the type and scale of production that the Joint Force requires for the
priorities before us. We will simultaneously leverage allied and partner production not just to
meet our own requirements but also to incentivize them to increase defense spending and
help them field additional forces as quickly as possible. In the process, we will not only
ensure our own defense industrial advantage but also put our alliances on stronger footing so
that they can do their part to maintain peace through strength on a strong, equitable, and
enduring basis.
With the Department laser-focused on these priorities, we
will ensure that the Joint Force is ready to deter and, if
called upon, to prevail by achieving the nation’s objectives
against the most dangerous threats to Americans’ interests.
At the same time, this Strategy will enable the Joint Force
to provide President Trump with the operational flexibility
and agility required for other objectives, especially the
ability to launch decisive operations against targets
anywhere—including directly from the U.S. Homeland, as
America’s servicemembers so memorably demonstrated in
Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER. By ensuring that the
Joint Force is second to none, we will ensure the greatest
optionality for the President to employ America’s armed
forces.
The core logic of this Strategy, consistent with President
Trump’s historic and needed shift, is to put Americans’
interests first in a concrete and practical way. This requires
being clear-eyed about the threats that we face, as well as the resources available to both us and
our allies to confront them. It requires prioritizing what matters most for Americans and where
President Donald J. Trump salutes during the
Pentagon’s 9/11 Observance Ceremony on
September 11, 2025.
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the gravest and most consequential threats to their interests lie. It requires being honest and clear
with our allies and partners that they simply must do more rapidly, not as a favor to Americans
but for their own interests. This will entail a sharp shift—in approach, focus, and tone. But that is
what is needed to shift away from the legacy course headed for disaster and toward making
America great again. It is also the one that will set the conditions for lasting peace not only at
home but abroad—in other words, a better outcome not only for Americans but also for our allies
and partners. Out with utopian idealism; in with hardnosed realism. That is the mission we at
DoW must embrace—boldly, actively, and without hesitation.
President Trump is leading our nation into a new golden age. As he does, he speaks often about
restoring peace. But he is equally clear that we can only do so from a position of strength—
including, fundamentally, military strength. Only the Department of War can provide that power
to ensure that the nation’s interests are defended, and we will unapologetically do so. We will be
our nation’s sword and its shield, always ready to be wielded decisively at the President’s
direction, in service of his vision for lasting peace through strength. This National Defense
Strategy (NDS) shows how.
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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
At its heart, as the NSS lays out, an America First strategy must evaluate, sort, and prioritize. It
must practically correlate ends, ways, and means in a realistic fashion. Consistent with this
approach, this Strategy is defined by a realistic, practical approach to clearly understanding the
threats Americans face and how realistically and pragmatically those threats can be addressed in
ways consistent with American interests.
This Strategy is fundamentally different from the grandiose strategies of the past post–Cold War
administrations, untethered as they were from a concrete focus on Americans’ practical interests.
It does not conflate Americans’ interests with those of the rest of the world—that a threat to a
person halfway around the world is the same as to an American. Nor does it see implanting our
way of life by force as necessary. It does not seek to solve all the world’s problems. Rather, it
focuses in practical ways on real, credible threats to Americans’ security, freedom, and
prosperity. As it does so, it recognizes that some threats—like to our Homeland—are more direct
and visceral than others. Yet it also acknowledges that even those that may feel distant—like the
importance of maintaining U.S. access to the Indo-Pacific, the world’s largest market area—still
have exceptionally real—indeed, fundamental—implications for our nation’s vital interests.
As the NSS directs, this Strategy recognizes very clearly that not all threats are of equal severity,
gravity, and consequence. But even those of lesser salience still matter and must not be ignored.
Therefore, even as this Strategy prioritizes those threats of gravest consequence to our nation’s
security, freedom, and prosperity, it also positions our nation and our allies and partners to
counter the others in an effective, sustainable manner. In doing so, it sets conditions for peace
through strength not just over the remainder of the President’s term but for many years to come.
HOMELAND AND HEMISPHERE
For decades, America’s foreign policy establishment neglected our nation’s Homeland defenses.
This was partly due to the view that such defenses were no longer necessary. But it was also
informed by an increasing desire on the part of Washington decisionmakers to ease border
controls and facilitate the illegal migration of people and the unchecked, unfair flow of goods.
The sorry results speak for themselves. In recent decades, our nation has been overwhelmed by a
flood of illegal aliens. At the same time, narcotics have poured across our borders, poisoning
hundreds of thousands of Americans. Narcotics traffickers in our hemisphere have profited
enormously off this evil and are rightly designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) as a
result—but that is not all. Operation SOUTHERN SPEAR shows that President Trump is deadly
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serious about preventing narco-terrorists from trafficking lethal narcotics into our country. The
President is also serious about bringing narco-terrorists to justice. Nicolas Maduro, for instance,
thought that he could poison Americans with impunity. Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE
taught him otherwise—and all narco-terrorists should take note.
More direct military threats to the American Homeland have also grown in recent years,
including nuclear threats as well as a variety of conventional strike and space, cyber,
electromagnetic warfare capabilities. At the same time, although the United States has severely
degraded Islamic terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS in recent decades, these actors
continue to adapt and pose a credible threat.
American interests are also under threat throughout
the Western Hemisphere. As early as the 19th
century, our predecessors recognized that the
United States must take a more powerful, leading
role in hemispheric affairs in order to safeguard our
nation’s own economic and national security. It was
this insight that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine
and subsequent Roosevelt Corollary. But the
wisdom of this approach was lost, as we took our
dominant position for granted even as it started to slip away. As a result, we have seen
adversaries’ influence grow from Greenland in the Arctic to the Gulf of America, the Panama
Canal, and locations farther south. This not only threatens U.S. access to key terrain throughout
the hemisphere; it also leaves the Americas less stable and secure, undermining both U.S.
interests and those of our regional partners.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)
By any measure, China is already the second most powerful country in the world—behind only
the United States—and the most powerful state relative to us since the 19th century. And, while
China faces very significant internal economic, demographic, and societal challenges, the fact is
that its power is growing. Beijing has already spent vast amounts on the PLA in recent years,
often at the expense of domestic priorities. Yet China can still afford to spend even more on its
military, should it choose to do so—and it has shown that it is able to do so effectively. Indeed,
the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup speak for themselves, including
forces designed for operations in the Western Pacific as well as those capable of reaching targets
much farther away.
“American interests are
also under threat
throughout the Western
Hemisphere.”
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This matters for America’s interests because, as the NSS recognizes, the Indo-Pacific will soon
make up more than half of the global economy. The American people’s security, freedom, and
prosperity are therefore directly linked to our ability to trade and engage from a position of
strength in the Indo-Pacific. Were China—or anyone else, for that matter—to dominate this
broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans’ access to the world’s
economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation’s economic prospects,
including our ability to reindustrialize.
That is why the NSS directs DoW to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the IndoPacific. Not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our
goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor
anyone else can dominate us or our allies. This does not require regime change or some other
existential struggle. Rather, a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can
also accept and live under, is possible. That is the wise premise of President Trump’s visionary
and realistic approach to diplomacy with Beijing. At the same time, the Department’s efforts will
provide the undergirding strength for this approach.
RUSSIA
Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the
foreseeable future. Indeed, although Russia suffers from a variety of demographic and economic
difficulties, its ongoing war in Ukraine shows that it still retains deep reservoirs of military and
industrial power. Russia has also shown that it has the national resolve required to sustain a
protracted war in its near abroad. In addition, although the Russian military threat is primarily
focused on Eastern Europe, Russia also possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, which it
continues to modernize and diversify, as well as undersea, space, and cyber capabilities that it
could employ against the U.S. Homeland.
In light of this, the Department will ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to defend against
Russian threats to the U.S. Homeland. The Department will also continue to play a vital role in
NATO itself, even as we calibrate U.S. force posture and activities in the European theater to
better account for the Russian threat to American interests as well as our allies’ own capabilities.
Moscow is in no position to make a bid for European hegemony. European NATO dwarfs Russia
in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power. At the same time, although
Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power. It
follows that, although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must—and will—prioritize
defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China.
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Fortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia—it is not even close.
Germany’s economy alone dwarfs that of Russia. At the same time, under President Trump’s
leadership, NATO allies have committed to raise defense spending to the new global standard of
5% of GDP in total, with 3.5% of GDP invested in hard military capabilities. Our NATO allies
are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional
defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting
Ukraine’s defense. As President Trump has said, the war in Ukraine must end. As he has also
emphasized, however, this is Europe’s responsibility first and foremost. Securing and sustaining
peace will therefore require leadership and commitment from our NATO allies.
IRAN
President Trump has consistently made clear that Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear
weapons. And with Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER, he showed that he follows through on his
word—decisively. No other military in the world could have executed an operation of such scale,
complexity, and consequence as Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER. Yet the Joint Force did so
flawlessly and obliterated Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. forces also provided critical support to
Israel’s defense throughout the 12-Day War, enabling Israel’s historic operational and strategic
successes. Now, Iran’s regime is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades.
Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” is similarly devastated. Israeli operations have left Hezbollah and
Hamas severely degraded. At President Trump’s direction, the United States also launched
Operation ROUGH RIDER, which degraded the Houthis’ strike capabilities and ultimately
compelled the Houthis to sue for peace—and stop shooting at U.S. ships. In the process, through
Non-US NATO $26 TrillionRussia $2 Trillion
Non-U.S. NATO Economic Capacity Far Outpaces Russia
SOURCE: World Bank (2024)
Nominal GDP in Trillions of U.S. Dollars (2024)
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a short, sharp, and decisive
campaign, the President was able to
restore freedom of navigation for
U.S. vessels.
Even so, although Iran has suffered
severe setbacks over recent months,
it appears intent on reconstituting its
conventional military forces. Iran’s
leaders have also left open the
possibility that they will try again to
obtain a nuclear weapon, including
by refusing to engage in meaningful
negotiations. Moreover, although Iran’s proxies have been severely degraded, they may also seek
to rebuild devastated infrastructure and capabilities. Nor can we ignore the facts that the Iranian
regime has the blood of Americans on its hands, that it remains intent on destroying our close
ally Israel, and that Iran and its proxies routinely instigate regional crises that not only threaten
the lives of American servicemembers in the region but also prevent the region itself from
pursuing the kind of peaceful and prosperous future that so many of its leaders and peoples
clearly wish for.
Yet there are significant opportunities before us as well. Israel has long demonstrated that it is
both willing and able to defend itself with critical but limited support from the United States.
Israel is a model ally, and we have an opportunity now to further empower it to defend itself and
promote our shared interests, building on President Trump’s historic efforts to secure peace in the
Middle East. Likewise, in the Gulf, U.S. partners are increasingly willing and able to do more to
defend themselves against Iran and its proxies, including by acquiring and fielding a variety of
U.S. military systems. This creates even more opportunities for us to enable individual partners
to do more for their defense. It will also enable us to foster integration between regional partners,
so that they can do even more together.
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
The DPRK poses a direct military threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well as to Japan,
both of which are U.S. treaty allies. Although many of North Korea’s large conventional forces
are aged or poorly maintained, South Korea must stay vigilant against the threat of a North
Korean invasion. North Korea’s missile forces are also capable of striking targets in the ROK
and Japan with conventional and nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.
At the same time, the DPRK’s nuclear forces are increasingly capable of threatening the U.S.
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Dan Caine brief the success of Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER.
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Homeland. These forces are growing in size and sophistication, and they present a clear and
present danger of nuclear attack on the American Homeland.
THE SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED
BURDEN-SHARING
It is only prudent for the United States and its allies to be prepared for the possibility that one or
more potential opponents might act together in a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across
multiple theaters. Such a scenario would be less of a concern if our allies and partners had spent
recent decades investing adequately in their defenses. But they did not. Instead, with rare
exceptions, they were too often content to allow the United States to defend them, while they cut
defense spending and invested
instead in things like public
welfare and other domestic
programs. Nor were they the only
ones at fault. Certainly, it was their
own decision to underinvest in
their respective defenses. But it
was a decision often encouraged
by past U.S. policymakers, who
imprudently believed that the
United States benefited from allies
who were more dependencies than
they were partners.
Fortunately, that is over now. As President Trump has made clear, our allies and partners must
shoulder their fair share of the burden of our collective defense. This is the right thing for them to
do, especially after decades of the United States subsidizing their defense. But it is also vital
from a strategic perspective—both for us and for them. And thanks to President Trump’s
leadership, since January 2025, we have seen our allies beginning to step up, especially in
Europe and South Korea.
This is why burden-sharing is such an essential ingredient of this Strategy, even as DoW
prioritizes growing the Joint Force and advocating defense spending toplines to support such
growth. America’s alliances and partnerships form a defensive perimeter around Eurasia. Not
only do these relationships offer favorable geography, but they also include many of the world’s
wealthiest nations. Taken together, our alliance network is far wealthier than all our potential
adversaries combined. As a result, if our allies and partners invest properly in their defenses,
President Donald J. Trump speaks at the NATO Hague Summit after securing
historic defense spending commitments from our NATO allies.
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consistent with the new global standard set at the Hague Summit, together we can generate more
than enough forces to deter potential opponents, including if they act concurrently.
In these ways, we will maintain favorable balances of power in each of the world’s key regions,
as directed by the NSS. As U.S. forces focus on Homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific, our
allies and partners elsewhere will take primary responsibility for their own defense with critical
but more limited support from American forces. This will enable President Trump to set us on a
course to sustain peace through strength for decades to come and leave our alliances and
partnerships stronger than they have been at any point since the end of the Cold War.
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STRATEGIC APPROACH
The Department’s strategic approach rests on the following key lines of effort (LOEs):
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland
2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation
3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners
4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base
The remainder of this section provides further clarity, guidance, and direction for each LOE.
LINE OF EFFORT 1: DEFEND THE U.S. HOMELAND
As President Trump has said, the U.S. military’s foremost priority is to defend the U.S.
Homeland. The Department will therefore prioritize doing just that, including by defending
America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will do so as follows:
► Secure Our Borders. Border security is national security. DoW will therefore prioritize
efforts to seal our borders, repel forms of invasion, and deport illegal aliens in coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
► Counter Narco-Terrorists in the Hemisphere. Even as the Department works to secure
America’s borders, we recognize that threats to those borders must also be addressed deeper
in the hemisphere. We will therefore help to develop partners’ ability to degrade narcoterrorist organizations across the Americas and support them as they do, while also
maintaining our ability to take decisive action unilaterally. But if our partners cannot or will
do not do their part, then we will be prepared to act decisively on our own, as the Joint Force
demonstrated in Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
► Secure Key Terrain in the Western Hemisphere. As the NSS lays out, the United States
will no longer cede access to or influence over key terrain in the Western Hemisphere. DoW
will therefore provide the President with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and
commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the
Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal. We will ensure that the Monroe Doctrine is upheld
in our time.
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► Defend America’s Skies with President Trump’s Golden Dome for America and Other,
Drone-Specific Measures. The Department will prioritize efforts to develop President
Trump’s Golden Dome for America, with a specific focus on options to cost-effectively
defeat large missile barrages and other advanced aerial attacks. In addition, DoW will
develop and deploy capabilities and systems to counter unmanned aerial systems. We will
also ensure that U.S. forces have access to the electromagnetic spectrum required to defend
the Homeland.
► Modernize and Adapt U.S. Nuclear Forces. The United States requires a strong, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal adapted to the nation’s overall and defense strategies. We will
modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and
escalation management amidst the changing global nuclear landscape. The United States
should never—will never—be left vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.
► Deter and Defend Against Cyber Threats. The Department will prioritize bolstering cyber
defenses for U.S. military and certain civilian targets. DoW will also develop other options to
deter or degrade cyber threats to the U.S. Homeland.
► Counter Islamic Terrorists. The Department will maintain a resource-sustainable approach
to countering Islamic terrorists, focused on organizations that possess the capability and
intent to strike the U.S. Homeland.
After years of neglect, the Department of War will restore American military dominance in
the Western Hemisphere. We will use it to protect our Homeland and our access to key
terrain throughout the region. We will also deny adversaries’ ability to position forces or
other threatening capabilities in our hemisphere. This is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine—a commonsense and potent restoration of American power and prerogatives in
this hemisphere, consistent with Americans’ interests.
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LINE OF EFFORT 2: DETER CHINA IN THE INDO-PACIFIC THROUGH
STRENGTH, NOT CONFRONTATION
The Department of War will follow President Trump’s lead in engaging our PLA counterparts
through a wider range of formats. As we do so, our focus will be on supporting strategic stability
and on deconfliction and de-escalation more broadly. At the same time, President Trump has
made clear his desire for a decent peace in the Indo-Pacific, where trade flows openly and fairly,
we can all prosper, and our interests are respected. DoW will use these engagements to help
communicate that vision and intent to Chinese authorities, while also demonstrating through our
behavior our own sincere desire to achieve and sustain such a peaceful and prosperous future.
We will not lose sight, however, of President Trump’s most important direction for the
Department—peace through strength. Recognizing this, it is our essential responsibility at DoW
to ensure that President Trump is always able to negotiate from a position of strength in order to
sustain peace in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, as the NSS directs, we will build, posture, and
sustain a strong denial defense along the FIC. We will also work closely with our allies and
partners in the region to incentivize and enable them to do more for our collective defense,
especially in ways that are relevant to an effective denial defense. Through these efforts, we will
make clear that any attempt at aggression against U.S. interests will fail and is therefore not
worth attempting in the first place. That is the essence of deterrence by denial.
In this manner, DoW will provide the military strength for President Trump’s visionary and
realistic diplomacy, thereby setting conditions for a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that
allows all of us—the United States, China, and others in the region—to enjoy a decent peace. At
the same time, in the process of erecting a strong denial defense along the FIC, DoW will ensure
that the Joint Force always has the ability to conduct devastating strikes and operations against
targets anywhere in the world, including directly from the U.S. Homeland, thereby providing the
President with second-to-none operational flexibility and agility.
LINE OF EFFORT 3: INCREASE BURDEN-SHARING WITH U.S. ALLIES AND
PARTNERS
Consistent with the President’s approach as detailed in the NSS, this Strategy prioritizes dealing
with the greatest threats to Americans’ interests. But it does not neglect the other threats. Rather,
building on the President’s approach, this Strategy relies on sensibly and prudently pressing and
enabling U.S. allies and partners to take primary responsibility for defending against those other
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threats, with critical but more limited U.S. support. In doing so, it sets the conditions for lasting
peace through strength across all theaters.
To that end, the Department will prioritize strengthening incentives for allies and partners to take
primary responsibility for their own defense in Europe, the Middle East, and on the Korean
Peninsula, with critical but limited support from U.S. forces. At the same time, we will seek to
make it as easy as possible for allies and partners to take on a greater share of the burden of our
collective defense, including through close collaboration on force and operational planning and
working closely to bolster their forces’ readiness for key missions.
As President Trump has shown, there must be clear accountability. Incentives work and will be a
critical part of our alliance policy. We will therefore prioritize cooperation and engagements with
model allies—those who are spending as they need to and visibly doing more against threats in
their regions, with critical but limited U.S. support—including through arms sales, defense
industrial collaboration, intelligence-sharing, and other activities that leave our nations better off.
In practical terms, DoW will proceed as follows:
► Western Hemisphere. Canada and Mexico have strong roles in hemispheric defense,
including by working with DoW and other U.S. agencies to prevent illegal aliens and narcoterrorists from reaching America’s borders. Canada also has a vital role to play in helping to
defend North America against other threats, including by strengthening defenses against air,
missile, and undersea threats. In addition, U.S. partners throughout the Western Hemisphere
can do far more to help combat illegal migration as well as to degrade narco-terrorists and
prevent U.S. adversaries from controlling or otherwise exercising undue influence over key
terrain, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal. The Department
will work with nations across the hemisphere to advance these objectives, incentivizing and
enabling them to step up accordingly.
► Europe. As the NSS makes clear, Europe taking primary responsibility for its own
conventional defense is the answer to the security threats it faces. The Department will
therefore incentivize and enable NATO allies to take primary responsibility for Europe’s
conventional defense with critical but more limited U.S. support. Central to this effort, DoW
will work closely with our allies to ensure that they deliver on the defense spending pledge
that they made at the Hague Summit. We will also seek to leverage NATO processes in
support of these goals, while also working to expand transatlantic defense industrial
cooperation and reduce defense trade barriers in order to maximize our collective ability to
produce forces required to achieve U.S. and allied defense objectives. Finally, we will be
clear with our European allies that their efforts and resources are best focused on Europe.
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This is for the simple reason that it is in Europe where they can—and must—make the
greatest difference for our collective defense.
► Middle East. As President
Trump laid out in his historic
Riyadh speech, the United
States seeks a more peaceful
and prosperous Middle East.
As the President also made
clear, however, this
transformation can only come
at the hands of those with the
greatest stake in the region’s
future—our allies and partners
in the region itself. Our task is
to support them in that effort,
building on the strong
foundation that President Trump has laid through his clear-eyed, tireless diplomacy. To that
end, DoW will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for
deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel’s
efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling
integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump’s
historic initiative, the Abraham Accords. As we do, DoW will maintain our ability to take
focused, decisive action to defend U.S. interests. Through this approach, we can set and
reinforce conditions for lasting peace through strength in the region.
► Africa. The Department’s priority in Africa is to prevent Islamic terrorists from using
regional safe havens to strike the U.S. Homeland. Consistent with this Strategy’s resourcesustainable approach to counterterrorism, we will stand ready to take direct action against
Islamic terrorists who are both capable of and intent on striking the U.S. Homeland,
including in close coordination with interagency and foreign partners. We will
simultaneously seek to empower allies and partners to lead efforts to degrade and destroy
other terrorist organizations.
► Korean Peninsula. With its powerful military, supported by high defense spending, a robust
defense industry, and mandatory conscription, South Korea is capable of taking primary
responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support. South
Korea also has the will to do so, given that it faces a direct and clear threat from North
Korea. This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in
updating U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula. In this way, we can ensure a stronger
President Trump’s leadership is remaking the world into a more peaceful
and prosperous place, including the Middle East.
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and more mutually beneficial alliance relationship that is better aligned with America’s
defense priorities, thereby setting conditions for lasting peace.
LINE OF EFFORT 4: SUPERCHARGE THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
The U.S. DIB is the foundation to rebuilding and adapting our military so that it remains the
strongest in the world. President Trump has succeeded in working with Congress to deliver and
lead a once-in-a-century revival of American industry and a generational investment in our
nation’s defense, and we must be good stewards of those precious resources. Doing so is vital to
ensuring that U.S. forces have the weapons, equipment, and transportation and distribution
capability needed to implement this Strategy. It is also critical to ensuring that the United States
can help arm allies and partners as they take on a greater share of the burden of our collective
defense, including by leading efforts to deter or defend against other, lesser threats. The DIB thus
undergirds the other key pillars of this Strategy. We will therefore take urgent action to mobilize,
renew, and secure it—to supercharge American defense industry so that it is ready to meet the
challenges of our era as effectively as it did those of the last century.
Our fighting force depends on the DIB to produce, deliver, and sustain critical munitions,
systems, and platforms. Our readiness, lethality, range, and survivability—and, ultimately, the
military options we provide—are directly linked to the DIB’s ability to securely develop, field,
sustain, resupply, and transport the equipment and materiel that affords us our warfighting
advantage. We will therefore bolster our organic sustainment capabilities, grow nontraditional
vendors, and partner with traditional DIB vendors, Congress, our allies and partners, and other
federal departments and agencies to reinvigorate and mobilize our great nation’s unrivaled
creativity and ingenuity, re-spark our innovative spirit, and restore our industrial capacity.
Making the DIB great again requires clear vision, strong relationships, and a solid commitment
to rebuild the ultimate foundation of our military strength.
As the NSS makes clear, this effort will require nothing short of a national mobilization—a call
to industrial arms on par with similar revivals of the last century that ultimately powered our
nation to victory in the world wars and the Cold War that followed.
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CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
Taking our nation from the precipice of a
world war just a year ago, President
Trump is now leading our nation into a
new golden age, one defined by putting
Americans first in a commonsense,
pragmatic, and concrete way. No longer
will we squander Americans’ will,
resources, and even lives in foolish and
grandiose adventures abroad. But we will
not retreat. Rather, we will unabashedly
prioritize Americans’ concrete interests
with an approach of flexible realism. We
will restore the warrior ethos. We will
refocus the American military on its core,
irreplaceable goal of winning the nation’s
wars decisively.
In doing so—as President Trump has so
memorably emphasized—our purpose
will not be aggression or perpetual war. Rather, our goal is peace. Peace is the highest good. But
not a peace that sacrifices our people’s security, freedoms, and prosperity. Rather, a peace that
Americans deserve—a noble and proud peace. Fortunately, this peace is compatible with the
interests of our potential opponents, if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined. We do
not demand their humiliation or submission. Rather, we demand only that they respect our
reasonably conceived interests and those of our allies and partners who stand stoutly with us. If
we all can acknowledge this, we can achieve a flexible and sustainable balance of power among
us, and peace.
But we at the Department of War will be ready if our gracious offer is spurned. We know that
wishing for a decent peace is not the same thing as bringing it about. Thus, if our potential
opponents are unwise enough to reject our peaceful overtures and choose conflict instead,
America’s armed forces will stand ready to fight and win the nation’s wars in ways that make
sense for Americans. To ensure that is the case, this Strategy will ensure that we see things and
the choices we need to make clearly. We will prioritize addressing the most consequential and
grave threats to Americans’ interests. We will revamp our network of allies and partners to meet
the threats we face. And we will be ready, always carrying the sharpest and most formidable
sword but prepared to offer the olive branch.
President Donald J. Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth render honors during a Memorial
Day Wreath-Laying Ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier
at Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, Virginia.
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=
Perplexity
このファイルは、トランプ政権第2期（2025年以降）を前提とした「National Defense Strategy（国家防衛戦略）」という体裁の英文文書で、アメリカ国防政策の基本方針を示す戦略文書です。
文書の位置づけと全体像
「UNCLASSIFIED」と明記された公表前提の戦略文書という形式で、国防総省にあたる組織を「Department of War（戦争省）」と呼び換えているのが特徴です。
序文では、トランプ大統領が「世界でもっとも強力な軍事力を再建した」としつつ、同政権発足時点の国際安全保障環境を「きわめて危険」と規定しています。
全体は大きく「安全保障環境」「戦略的アプローチ」の2本柱で構成され、最後に「結論」として「平和を最高善とするが、平和は力を通じて確保する」というメッセージで締めくくられます。
想定する主要脅威
米本土と西半球：不法移民と麻薬流入、ナルコテロ組織、パナマ運河やグリーンランドなど要衝への他国影響拡大を脅威と位置づけ、「モンロー主義のトランプ版コロラリー」で対処するとしています。
中国：米国に次ぐ大国であり、軍備拡張の「速度・規模・質」を特に警戒し、インド太平洋で米国のアクセスと影響力を維持することを死活的利益とみなします。
ロシア：経済・人口面で制約はあるが、ウクライナ戦争の継戦能力や最大規模の核戦力を持つ「持続的だが管理可能な脅威」とし、欧州防衛は基本的にNATO欧州側の責任と位置づけます。
イラン：核武装阻止を掲げ、「MIDNIGHT HAMMER」作戦で核計画を壊滅させたと描写しつつ、再建の可能性と代理勢力（ヒズボラ、ハマス、フーシ派など）の復活を警戒対象としています。
北朝鮮：韓国・日本への直接脅威に加え、米本土攻撃能力を持つ核戦力の高度化を重大な危険として強調します。
戦略の4つの「努力ライン」
米本土防衛
国境封鎖と不法移民の送還を「国防」の一部と位置づけ、国土安全保障省と連携しつつ軍事的関与を拡大する方針です。
西半球でのナルコテロ組織への攻撃、パナマ運河・グリーンランド・「Gulf of America」など要衝へのアクセス確保を軍事的任務としています。
「Golden Dome for America」と呼ぶ大規模ミサイル防衛構想と、無人機（ドローン）対処能力の整備、核戦力の近代化、サイバー防衛強化、イスラム過激派への限定的対テロ作戦を掲げています。
インド太平洋での対中抑止（対決でなく「力による平和」）
第一列島線（First Island Chain）に「強力な拒否的防衛（denial defense）」を築くことを核心に据え、中国に地域覇権を握らせない「勢力均衡」を目標とします。
中国との軍事対話チャネル拡大や危機管理を進める一方、「支配でも屈服でもない『まともな平和』」を追求するというレトリックが使われています。
同盟国・パートナーへの負担転換（負担分担）
基本方針は「米本土防衛と対中抑止を米国が優先し、それ以外の地域脅威は同盟国・パートナーが主体的に担う」というものです。
NATOについては、ハーグ・サミットで合意したとされる「国防費5％（うち3.5％を純軍事）」を新基準とし、欧州がロシア抑止とウクライナ支援を主導すべきと明言しています。
中東では、イスラエルを「模範的同盟国」としつつ、湾岸諸国の防衛努力強化とイスラエルとの統合（アブラハム合意の拡張）を重視し、米軍は「限定的だが決定的な」軍事オプション保持に集中する構図です。
韓国については、高い国防費と徴兵制、産業基盤を背景に「北朝鮮抑止の主たる担い手」と位置づけ、米軍は支援的役割へ比重を移すことを目指しています。
アフリカは、米本土を直接狙うイスラム過激派への対テロ作戦に絞り、それ以外は域内国に主導させる「資源節約型」アプローチです。
防衛産業基盤（DIB）の「スーパー・チャージ」
冷戦期の総力動員に匹敵する「国家的な産業動員」を訴え、国内製造業復活と連動した防衛産業の再建を戦略の中核に据えています。
重要弾薬・プラットフォームの生産能力強化、新興企業や同盟国の生産能力活用、規制緩和による供給力拡大などを通じて、「世界の兵器庫」としての地位回復を目標とします。
基本理念とトーンの特徴
一貫して「America First」「平和をもたらすのは力」「同盟国は依存先ではなく、自らの利益のためにもっと負担すべき」という政治的メッセージが前面に出ています。
冷戦後の米国外交・安全保障エリートを、国境開放、産業の海外移転、「理想主義的な国家建設戦争」で国力を浪費した存在として批判し、「ハードな現実主義」への転換を宣言しています。
軍の「ウォリアー・エトス（戦士精神）」の復活を重視し、トランプ大統領を中心とする写真キャプションまで含め、国内向け政治文書としての色彩も非常に濃い構成です。
Gemini
これは、2025年1月に再就任したトランプ大統領の下で策定された「国防戦略（NDS）」の導入部および安全保障環境の分析です。
この文書は「アメリカ・ファースト」の原則に基づき、現実主義的な視点から米国の国防優先事項を再定義しています。
概要
この戦略の核心は、過去の「理想主義」から脱却し、米国の実益に直結する課題に集中することにあります。
特に、中国への対応、国土防衛、そして同盟国による防衛負担の劇的な増額（GDP比5%目標）を重視しています。
戦略の4つの柱（優先事項）
文書では、国防省が集中すべき以下の4つの活動ラインを挙げています。
米国本土の防衛 ボーダーセキュリティの強化、ミサイル防衛網「ゴールデン・ドーム」の構築、および中南米の麻薬テロリストへの対処を含みます。
力による中国の抑止 インド太平洋地域での軍事バランスを維持し、中国による支配を阻止します。対決ではなく、強い立場からの交渉を目指します。
同盟国との負担分担の増大 同盟国を「依存先」ではなく「パートナー」と見なし、NATO諸国等に対し、国防費をGDP比計5%まで引き上げるよう求めます。
防衛産業基盤の強化 米国を再び「世界の兵器庫」とするため、AIなどの新技術を導入し、国内の製造能力を飛躍的に高めます。
安全保障環境の分析
現在の脅威について、以下のように分析しています。
本土および西半球
不法移民や麻薬密輸が深刻な脅威となっており、モンロー主義に基づき、パナマ運河やグリーンランドなどの重要拠点へのアクセスを確保します。
中国
米国にとって最大の競争相手であり、インド太平洋の経済圏を支配されないよう「第一列島線」に強固な拒否的抑止力を構築します。
ロシア
NATOの東側諸国にとって持続的な脅威ですが、欧州諸国が自らの防衛の主責任を負うべきであるとしています。
イラン
核開発は容赦しない姿勢を示し、中東のパートナー諸国（特にイスラエル）が自衛能力を高めることを支援します。
北朝鮮
米国本土および同盟国（日本・韓国）に対する核・ミサイルの直接的な脅威として認識されています。
同盟国への要求と「同時性」の問題
複数の地域で同時に紛争が発生するリスク（同時性問題）に対し、米国単独ではなく、同盟国が応分の負担をすることで対処する方針を強調しています。
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